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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a methodology for evaluating tasks 
performed by a joint staff as set forth in the Universal 
Joint Task List (UITL). Measures of effectiveness are 
defined for selected sustainment and intelligence tasks. 
Results of experimental runs of the Joint Theater Level 
Simulation are presented to demonstrate the analysis 
process. Emphasis is placed on providing the staff 
planner with an ability to associate causal reasons for 
significant events in the exercise. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The Universal Joint Task List (MCM 147-93), a 
supplement to the Joint Training Manual (MCM 71-92), 
is a comprehensive listing of all joint tasks pertaining to 
the Armed Forces of the United States. It is intended to 
provide a common language for describing joint 
warfighting capabilities throughout the entire range of 
military operations to include operations other than war. 
Specifically, tasks are defined as they relate to the 
strategic (both national and theater), operational, and 
tactical levels of war. Each joint task is broken down 
into supporting tasks which may in turn be further 
refined into enabling tasks. 
One of the primary training tools available to a 
Commander in Chief (CINC) for training his staff on 
their joint mission essential tasks is a command post 
exercise supported by a computer simulation model. 
This is commonly referred to as a Computer Aided 
Exercise (CAX). The primary role of the computer 
simulation is to present a decision environment within 
which the staff can be presented with realistic, 
stochastic results. Based on this simulated environment, 
staffs implement plans, monitor the current situation, 
and further develop or alter its plan as required by 
changing requirements. 
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This paper develops an exercise analysis 
methodology for evaluating CINC staff performance in 
the execution of joint tasks during the conduct of a 
CAX. Specific objectives are: 1) Determine quantifiable 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) designed to work in 
conjunction with data manipulated by a futuristic 
computer simulation. 2) Ensure the measures reflect the 
hierarchical structure of tasks as applied to the three 
levels of war (vertical linkage), and functionality 
considerations between related enabling tasks 
(horizontal linkage). 3) Test measures of effectiveness 
using the Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS). 
Develop a standardized ASCII file for capturing MOE 
parameters and demonstrate a potential post-exercise 
analysis. This objective entails a practical application of 
the objective portion of the methodology to an existing 
theater-level simulation. Included in this are the 
alignment of the model's database with required MOE 
parameters, development of algorithms required in post 
processing, and specification of output format. 
This paper provides a demonstration of the 
methodology for two strategic tasks: sustainment 
(logistics) and intelligence (reconnaissance). For each 
task a brief description of the MOEs is presented, 
followed by results from three runs of JTLS. The 
scenario used for the demonstration runs was an 
adaptation of the Gulf War conflict with modifications 
to stress the logistics and intelligence gathering 
functions. A compressed eight day conflict was played, 
with forces continuing to enter the theater after 
commencement of hostilities. It is important to 
understand that the results presented in this paper serve 
only to demonstrate the methodology. In particular, 
several of the combat functions such as attrition from 
and to aircraft and attrition of supply depots and 
convoys were not played in the experiment in order to 
more clearly demonstrate methodology objectives. 
Therefore, the results are not intended to be representa-
tive of what one might expect in an actual conflict. 
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2 SUSTAINMENT OF THE FORCE 
Fundamental to the methodology is the assumption that 
execution of any given task at a specified level of war is 
related to the execution of similar tasks at other levels of 
war. For instance, the strategic joint task "Provide 
Theater Sustainment" is related to the respective 
operational and tactical tasks "Provide Operational 
Support" and "Provide Combat Service Support" by 
virtue of their common functionality. Furthermore, the 
concept of a functional relationship establishes the idea 
of vertical and horizontal linkages existing among tasks. 
Vertical linkage not only describes the relationship 
existing between similar tasks across respective levels of 
war, but also between joint, supporting, and enabling 
tasks within a given level of war. Horizontal linkage, on 
the other hand, pertains to the dependent relationship 
existing between task(s) describing one particular 
function or component with those describing another. 
For example, how well forces are sustained is dependent 
upon how well the functions of arming, fueling, 
maintaining, manning, etc. are executed. Similarly, the 
functional area pertaining to the manning of forces is 
dependent upon the components field services, health 
services, reconstitution, training, and reception. Staff 
activities, as described by various tasks, become 
How well are forces armed? 
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ban the munitions 
they require? 
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Is the operational 
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meet ammunition and 
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campaigns and major 
operatiom assigned to 
him by the CINC ? (I.e. 
build stockpiles) I 
w; 
compartmentalized across components and functions as 
the size of the staff increases. In analysis, it is necessary 
to reflect the dynamics of vertical and horizontal 
linkage as a matter of aggregation and in the interest of 
maintaining the appropriate level of abstraction. 
2.1 Dendritic 
The purpose of the dendritic is to refine task 
requirements to the point where data explicative of 
performance can be gathered. The dendritic is formed 
by focusing on the overall intent of related (across levels 
of war) joint tasks and reformulating it in the form of a 
question. This question represents the overall issue to be 
resolved. Likewise, corresponding functional areas form 
critical (sub) issues that generally reflect the level at 
which measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are developed. 
Specific task requirements within each of the functional 
areas serve to formulate yet another level of sub issues 
that may determine underlying measures of performance 
(MOPs). Continued refinement of the (task) 
requirements ultimately leads to the point where data 
can be gathered. A complete dendritic addressing the 
issue regarding tactical forces having the munitions they 
require is illustrated in Figure 1. 
What tactical forces 
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Figure 1: Dendritic 
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2.2 Measures of Effectiveness 
In this paper, only those measures used in the 
experimental runs of JTLS are described. A more 
complete discussion of the logistical MOEs is given in 
Combs (1995). A generic representation of the measures 
used to describe the components of a logistics plan is 
shown in Figure 2. The following definitions apply to 
the figure: 
TACREQk.i}t) = amount of ammunition type, i, 
requirements for each unit, j, 
in operational area, k, at time, t. 
SPTREQk)t) = requirements for ammunition type, i, 
for operational area, k, in additional to 
tactical requirements of individual 
units within k, at time, t. 
RAMPi.k(t) = rate of build-up of ammunition type, 1, 
in operational area, k, at time, t, 
required for future planned missions. 
OPREQ1dt) = total operational requirements for 
ammunition type, i, operational 
area, k, at time, t. 
The two critical planning factors for the operational 
staff are the values of SPTREQ and RAMP. The amount 
of ammunition, SPTREQ, represents a contingency 
amount in case the individual requirements, T ACREQ, 
are not sufficient for the current mission. The trade-off 







enough at time, t, versus having to stockpile and 
transport unneeded ammunition. RAMP is the rate at 
which ammunition needs to be stockpiled to meet a 
future mission requirement, over and above the amount 
needed for the current mission. This build-up is required 
because a step function at time, f, in Figure 2 is not 
feasible due to loading and transportation assets 
limitations. Again, if the ramp function is too steep, 
excessive supplies will exist at time, f, thus creating a 
storage and transportation problem. In the next section, 
these measures, along with the actual on-band amounts 
from the experimental runs, will be described. 
2.3 Sample of Demonstration Runs Results 
Three runs of JTLS were conducted using the scenario 
previously described. Each run depicted planned 
objectives in the form of phased ammumt10n 
requirements by type using Basic Load as the parameter. 
Four categories of Class V (ammunition) were 
examined: gun ammunition (GVN), short range 
(M-SR), medium range (M-MR) and long range (ICM) 
missiles. The eight day scenario consisted of three 
phases: deployment, friendly defense and friendly 
attack. The basic load planned requirements for each 
ammunition category/phase are shown in Figure 3 for 
each phase. Note that Runs 2 and 3 differ from Run I 
(base case) in the amount of gun versus missile 
ammunition in the plan. 
time 
(C+ days) 
Figure 2: Ramp Function 
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Run 1 Run2 Rllll1 
GVN (9) (1/2/3) (.5/1/2) (2/3/4) 
M-SR (28) (1/2/3) (2/3/4) (.5/112) 
M-MR (29) (112/3) (2/3/4) (.5/1/2) 
ICM (32) (1/2/3) (2/3/4) (.5/1/2) 
Figure 3: Basic Load Requirements by Phase for Each Run 
EXCEL spreadsheets utilized large flat files of raw 
data from JTLS to perform the analyses. For this paper 
only one comparative analysis is presented. More 
complete results are given in Combs (1995). In Figures 
4 and 5, the planned, revised plan, and on-hand tonnage 
of gun ammunition (category 9) and short range 
missiles (category 28), respectively, over time are shown 
for the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division for Run 1 
(base case). The PLAN amounts are those tonnages by 
day contained in the Operations Plan developed prior to 
actual exercise initiation. The REV. PLAN amounts 
represent tonnages by day adjusted for the compression 
of the scenario upon exercise commencement to account 
for the early start of the defensive battle. The OfH 
amounts are those actually possessed by the unit over 
time, which includes consumption and receipts from 
















The ramp function for both planned and required 
tonnages anticipating the future attack mission is 
evident in both figures. The actual on-hand quantities, 
compared with the planned and revised planned 
amounts, provide the planner with a meaningful picture 
of how well the sustainment plan worked. Note that in 
both cases, the on-hand amount did exhibit the ramp 
effect from day 0 to day 5 in preparation for the attack 
mission. At the end of day 8 there were 130 tons of 
category 28 and 6300 tons of category 9 remaining. The 
exercise analyst would determine whether these 
quantities represent a shortfall or overage on day 8 and 
evaluate whether the planned ramp function was 
adequate. Similar plots of other units, as well as 
aggregates of units in the theater, serve to give a 
complete picture of sustainment performance. 
3 INTELLIGENCE 
Joint Military Intelligence exists at three levels, the 
highest level being strategic intelligence which is 
required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and 
military plans and operations at the national and theater 
level. The next level is operational intelligence which 
provides for conducting campaigns and major 
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Figure 4: Category 9; Run 1; 24th Mech. Div. 
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Figure 5: Category 28; Run 1; 24th Mech. Div. 
lowest level is tactical intelligence which supports the 
planning of battles and engagements, focusing at this 
level on specific combat elements and objectives. These 
three levels of intelligence compose the basic hierarchy 
of intelligence. Many of the past boundaries that existed 
between these levels of intelligence are growing less 
clear with the changes in information management 
systems and the rapid increase in technology. As an 
example, satellite reconnaissance, once a tool reserved 
for strategic intelligence, gradually became an integral 
part of operational intelligence, and now through such 
programs as the Tactical Exploitation of National 
Capabilities (1ENCAP) is being used at the tactical 
level. 
In the development of an exercise analysis 
methodology for evaluating CINC staff performance in 
the execution of joint intelligence tasks during the 
conduct of a CAX, it is insightful to regard the measure 
of any intelligence process as the answer to the 
question: How well was the information necessary for 
optimizing the outcome of an action provided in a 
timely, accurate, and understandable manner? An 
answer to this question is the goal for any analysis 
methodology. 
3.1 Report Score 
Typically a decision maker relies on two important 
pieces of information to make a judgment on the quality 
or value of an intelligence report. The first is reliability 
of the source of the intelligence, but unfortunately 
computer simulations generally do not attempt to model 
unreliable information sources. The second is age of the 
intelligence which can be modeled in most simulations. 
Therefore the main measure of how good is the 
intelligence on a particular unit will be measured by the 
report score shown in Equation (1). 
L wz,i,j(t) 
Report Scorei(t) = 1 (1) 
3 
where 
wli,j(t) -A utility weighting factor from 0 to 1 of the 
depreciation of intelligence data as a function 
of intelligence report element type, OTFU type, 
and age. 
Indices: 
-Other Than Friendly Unit {1st Rep Guard, 2nd 
Artillery Battalion ... } 
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t - current time (in integer hours from start of CAX} 
j(l J-age of last intelligence update me;L-;ured from 
significant event start time 
- intelligence report clement type (location, estimate 
of COA, strength} 
The report scnrc can provide a measure of how 
effective a CINC's intelligence staff ww; at providing 
valuable information on OTFUs with only limited 
~L-.;sumptions as to the structure of the decay of the value 
of the information as it is allowed to age. Combined 
with the identification of significant evcnL-.; occurring 
during an exercise, and the corresponding significant 
OTFUs, the report score will furnish some insight into 
the ability of an intelligence staff to furnish "fresh" 
information. 
3.2 Asset Needs Function 
An important aspect of the problem of collection asset 
allocation is the determination of the potential need for 
any particular collection asset or type of collection asset 
at any given time. The framework for measuring an 
intelligence staffs ability to adequately provide 
collection asset coverage within a theater of operation 
will be centered on maintaining a record of each 
collection asset's availability, and the potential need for 
that asset at any time during an exercise. An 
intelligence collection asset is considered to be available 
if it is determined that it could be tasked by the 
intelligence staff at that time to conduct a collection 
mission. Determination of the potential need for any 
collection asset at a specific time is slightly more 
involved. Potential need is established by whether there 
exists a significant Other Than Friendly Unit or units 
that have a sufficiently low report score, and whether 
there exists a collection asset that has a sufficiently high 
probability of detection for any of those significant 
OTFUs. The purpose of the Asset Needs Function is to 
show the existence of a perceived need for a particular 
collection a'sct to provide information on a particular 
OTFU at a specific time in the exercise. The Asset 
Needs Function can he written in the form: 
ANFi.k(t J = ( 1-(Report Scorei(t)) x pdi,k(t) x 
IMFi(t) x SRFk x TRFi,k (2) 
where the indidices are: 
-Other Than Friendly Unit ( lst Rep Guard, 2nd 
Artillery Battalion,. .. } 
k - intelligence collection asset (JST ARS, TR- I, 
HUMINT teams, ... } 
t - time (in hours from start of CAX t = 0, 1,2, ... }, 
and the component variables are defined as follows: 
pdi,k(l) - the probability of detecting OTFU i at time t, 
given that OTFU i is within sensor range of 
collection asset k. 
I MF i( t J - an importance factor assigned for the degree 
of significance of OTFU i at time, t. 
SRF k - a sensor range factor to adjust for the 
difference in volume of search area covered by 
the different sensors carried by the collection 
a-;set, k. 
TRFi,k - a target range factor to compensate for the 
range of the target from the staging point of 
the collection asset. Essentially, this implies 
that targets at the extreme limits of a 
collection asset's ability to search maybe 
harder to detect. 
For the ANF to return a high value, the report score on 
OTFU, i, must be low, and the probability of detection 
by collection asset, k, must be sufficiently high. In 
summary, the Asset Needs Function is intended to 
express the potential of a collection asset to improve the 
report score of an Other Than Friendly Unit. 
3.3 Sample Intelligence Results 
In order to demonstrate the methodology described 
above, eight Tactical Ballistic Missile (IBM) batteries were 
included in the JTLS scenario. These batteries moved 
continually during the scenario to determine how well 
the four intelligence platforms employed as reconnais-
sance assets performed. In addition, these assets were 
also searching for five Republican Guards Divisions 
moving out of Baghdad toward Kuwait. For this paper, 
two sample results are presented demonstrating results 
for a Report Score and an Asset Needs Function. More 
complete results are given in Towery (1995). 
The Report Score for all reconnaissance assets 
against TBM Battery A is shown in Figure 6 for the first 
seven days of the scenario. The "peaks" indicate points 
in time when a detection occurred followed by a decay 
in the value of the Report Score due to aging of the 
intelligence report. Note that during day four (72-96 
hours) no detections were made on Battery A. Further 
causal analysis revealed that most aircraft were down 
for maintenance, since the intelligence plan had called 
for flying all available reconnaissance aircraft from the 
first day. The Report Score results indicate that the plan 
may have been faulty. This information is critical to the 
Intelligence planner for adjusting asset allocation over time. 
The Asset Needs Function for one of the assets 
(aircraft A) shown in Figure 7 shows the same problem 
for day four. The figure also shows variations in the 
function for different TBMs. More extensive analyses of 
assets, TBMs, and Republican Guards Divisions are 
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Figure 6: Report Score for TBM Battery A 
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4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper is an initial effort to provide a method for 
evaluating how well a CINC staff performs various tasks 
as set forth in the Universal Joint Task List by using an 
exercise simulation driver such as the Joint Theater 
Level Simulation. Measures of effectiveness were 
developed for logistics and intelligence tasks. Output 
methods were developed to capture JTLS results in a flat 
file for use in a spreadsheet for post exercise analysis. 
The primary objective of the analysis was to enable the 
exercise participants to relate causal reasons to 
significant events which occurred during the exercise. 
Research is continuing at the Naval Postgraduate School 
to increase the scope of results to a broader range of 
tasks in the UJTL. 
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